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All usWe conducted a field experiment to study social influences on parti-
san political participation. We sent letters to 92,000 contributors dur-
ing the 2012 presidential election campaign. We randomized features
of the letters and measured the effects of these variations on the recip-
ients’ subsequent contributions. We find that making an individual’s
contributions more visible to her neighbors increases the contribu-
tions of supporters of the local majority party and decreases those of
supporters of the minority party. Individuals contribute more when
they perceive higher average contributions from own-party supporters
in their area and contribute less if there is a higher share of own-party
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Allparty or cause that an individual supports. As these activities take place in
a domain of social observation, they are subject to social effects. In this
paper, we use a novel field experiment to study social influences on par-
tisan participation.
Federal law dictates that campaign committees must report the iden-
tity of individuals who contribute over $200 to the Federal Election Com-
mission (FEC) along with personal information. The FEC makes these
contribution records not only publicly available but, more importantly,
easily accessible online. The FEC website provides up-to-date disaggre-
gated information about contributors, including full name and address,
occupation, employers, contribution amount and date, and the party and
candidate to which the contribution was made. Moreover, the FEC web-
site offers an online tool that allows visitors to search for contributors
on the basis of each of these characteristics (e.g., name, address).1 The
fact that an individual’s contributions are observable by others and that
an individual can observe (and thus be influenced by) the contributions
of othersmakes campaign contributions in theUnited States an excellent
context for studying partisan interactions.
In May 2012, we sent letters with individualized information related to
campaign contributions to a sample of 91,998 individuals from all US
states who, according to the FEC records, had made a contribution to a
presidential campaign between April 2011 and April 2012. Sample indi-
viduals contributed about $500 on average during this period. The letters
sent to these subjects were identical except for subtle variations in the in-
formation displayed that were randomly assigned to nondeceptively ma-
nipulate perceptions of the observability of campaign contributions and
of the nature of neighbors’ contributions. We used FEC records to mea-
sure the effect of the letter’s content on the subject’s subsequent contri-
butions during the 6months between themailing delivery and the end of
the 2012 presidential campaign.
The first treatment arm was designed to test for what we call the confor-
mity channel, which is the hypothesis that disclosing one’s party affiliation
through political participation results in better treatment by supporters
of one’s ownparty and in harsher treatment by supporters of the opposite
party. This type of letter provided information about the public nature of
campaign contribution records and how to access the FEC’s online search
tool. We randomly assigned these recipients to one of two subtreatments.
Individuals in one subtreatment received a letter indicating that theirs was
the only household in the area randomly chosen to be sent a letter of this1 Online app. A.9 provides more details about the FEC’s online search tool.
the quality of the paper substantially. Julian Amendolaggine provided excellent research
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partisan interactions 000type. Individuals in the other subtreatment received a letter that was iden-
tical to the first except that it indicated that their household along with
other households in the area had been randomly selected to receive a let-
ter of this type. The second subtreatment differs from the first in that other
individuals in the area also received information about how to access the
FEC records. We interpret the difference between these two subtreatments
as a change in the recipient’s perceived probability that her neighbors will
observe her future contributions.
The second treatment arm was designed to test for what we call the
comparison channel, which is the hypothesis that an individual’s political
participation depends on the observed political participation of her peers.
We sent a letter that listed the semi-anonymized names, the amounts con-
tributed, and the parties contributed to by nine contributors from the re-
cipient’s area of residence. We randomly selected those nine individuals
from the 30 contributors nearest to the recipient’s address. This selection
was based on a series of parameters that we varied randomly to create non-
deceptive exogenous variation along multiple dimensions of the list of
contributors, such as the average amount contributed. We interpret the
differences between these letters as differences in the recipient’s percep-
tion of the contributions of others.
Wefind strongevidence for the conformity channel.When contributions
are made more visible to others, an individual’s contribution increases if a
majority of her neighbors support her party but decreases if a majority sup-
port the opposite party. These effects are not only statistically significant
but also large in magnitude. Our preferred treatment-on-the-treated esti-
mates, which adjust for the possibility that mail is discarded, suggest that
in highly polarized areas, with 75 percent of neighbors supporting one
party, our higher-visibility treatment reduced the amount contributed by
minority supporters by 41 percent (relative to the baseline amount) and
increased the amount contributed by majority supporters by 15 percent.
We also find evidence for the comparison channel. Recipients contrib-
uted more when neighbors of the same party were shown to contribute
higher average amounts. This effect is significant both statistically and eco-
nomically. Our preferred treatment-on-the-treated estimate indicates that
for each additional $100 in the average amount contributed by own-party
neighbors, the recipient’s own contribution increased by $13.60. Individ-
uals did not contribute significantly more, however, when neighbors from
the opposite party were shown to contribute higher average amounts. This
finding is consistent with theories of identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2000),
according to which individuals form social norms based on the behavior of
peers with whom they identify (in this case, neighbors who support the
same party). In addition to the information on the average amount con-
tributed, we also examinedwhether individuals care about the distribution
of contributors across parties. We find that individuals contributed less
when there was a higher number of own-party relative to opposite-partyThis content downloaded from 128.032.010.164 on July 01, 2017 14:26:51 PM
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Allcontributors. This effect goes in the opposite direction of social norms but
is consistent with free-riding behavior.
We perform some simple back-of-the-envelope calculations to quantify
the effects of the conformity and comparison channels on a measure of
geographic polarization: the standard deviation of the Democratic share
of contributors across zip codes. First, we analyze the counterfactual sce-
nario in which individuals cannot identify the contributions of others—
that is, without conformity effects. We find that eliminating conformity
effects would decrease geographic polarization by 20 percent. Second,
we analyze a counterfactual scenario in which individuals ignore the con-
tribution behavior of others—that is, without comparison effects. The
counterfactual analysis suggests that eliminating the comparison chan-
nel would increase geographic polarization by only 1.1 percent.
Our paper relates to a series of recent studies on political participa-
tion. Regarding voting turnout, the literature has long emphasized the
importance of social pressure (Knack 1992) and social norms (Riker and
Ordeshook 1968). In a seminal contribution, Gerber, Green, and Lari-
mer (2008) conducted a field experiment in which, close to election day,
individuals were sent letters with lists of neighbors and their previous
voting turnout history. The letters also promised to publicize the recip-
ient’s future voting behavior to her neighbors. The authors found that
these letters had a large positive effect on subsequent turnout, which they
interpret as arising from some combination of social norms and social
pressure. Unlike most other forms of political participation, though, the
act of voting does not in itself reveal the party or cause that the individual
supports. As a result, Gerber et al. (2008) and other related studies (Funk
2010; DellaVigna et al. 2017) do not present any evidence about how indi-
viduals interact with peers from the same and the opposite party. Relatedly,
Gerber et al. (2013) show that some individuals do not vote because they
do not trust the privacy of voting, which suggests that they may not want
to disclose their partisan affiliation. To the best of our knowledge, our pa-
per is the first to provide field experimental evidence about partisan in-
teractions.
Also to the best of our knowledge, few papers present field experimen-
tal evidence on campaign contributions. A recent exception is the study
by Augenblick and Cunha (2015), who conducted an experiment in the
United States with randomly assigned solicitation messages to a group of
Democrat contributors, referencing the past contribution behavior of
members of the Democratic or Republican Party. We make an additional
methodological contribution by developing an experimental design to
disentangle the effects of being observed by others from the effects of
observing the behavior of others.
Our findings are also informative for the ongoing debate about the
reasons behind individual contributions to political campaigns. Individ-This content downloaded from 128.032.010.164 on July 01, 2017 14:26:51 PM
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partisan interactions 000ual contributions represent a large portion of campaign funding in the
United States, accounting for approximately 80 percent of the $1.7 bil-
lion raised in the 2012 presidential race. We interpret our evidence as
consistent with the hypothesis from Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and
Snyder (2003) that individual contributions are largely motivated by per-
sonal and social factors rather than just by the desire to obtain direct pri-
vate benefits from the political system.
Our findings on social incentives are also related to the literature on
prosocial behavior. With respect to the conformity channel, there is ev-
idence that social pressure is effective for inducing prosocial behavior.
Individuals are also more likely to give money to a charity when they can-
not avoid the solicitor (DellaVigna et al. 2012), and academics review
journal articles faster when their review times are made public (Chetty,
Saez, and Sandor 2014).2 In terms of political participation, individuals
are more likely to vote when their participation in elections is observable
to others (Gerber et al. 2008; DellaVigna et al. 2017). Related to the com-
parison channel, there is evidence that students are more likely to do-
nate to a university when told that a higher share of other students do-
nated in the past (Frey and Meier 2004). There is also evidence that
households’ energy consumption changes when they are provided with
information about the consumption of neighbors (Allcott 2011). The
fact that social pressure and social comparisons are also relevant factors
for individuals’ campaign contribution decisions suggests that making cam-
paign contributions can be considered, to a significant extent, as another
form of prosocial behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the relevant hy-
potheses and the experimental design used to test them. Section III pres-
ents the data sources and the implementation of the field experiment.
Section IV presents the main results. Section V provides a counterfactual
analysis of the conformity and comparison effects on geographic polariza-
tion. Section VI presents conclusions.II. Hypotheses and Experimental Design
A. The Conformity Channel
1. HypothesesIn their social interactions, individuals care about how they are per-
ceived by others and thus behave strategically to affect those social per-
ceptions (Benabou and Tirole 2006, 2011). In this paper, we consider2 One traditional interpretation for these findings is that individuals use these forms of
prosocial behavior to signal their altruism to others (Benabou and Tirole 2006, 2011;
Andreoni and Bernheim 2009; Ali and Lin 2013).
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supports. The existence of partisan favoritism has been long recognized
(e.g., Campbell et al. 1960) and is consistent with evidence that individ-
uals report more sympathy with supporters of their own political party
(e.g., Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015).
Most social-signaling models deal with actions that are unambiguously
perceived as good by all peers, in which case higher visibility is predicted
to increase prosocial behavior. Under partisan favoritism, however, con-
tributors interact with supporters of both parties and thus face a dual au-
dience. As a result, the effects of more visible contributions will depend
on the partisan composition of the peers with whom the individual inter-
acts. If an individual interacts only with supporters of her party, an in-
crease in the visibility of contributions would be expected to make con-
tributing more attractive, because of the positive effects on interactions
with like-minded peers. If, on the contrary, the individual interacts exclu-
sively with supporters of the opposite party, then higher visibility would
make contributions less attractive, because of the resulting negative ef-
fects in social interactions. Online appendix F provides a simple signal-
ing model in the spirit of Bernheim (1994) that formalizes this intuition.2. Experimental DesignThe first treatment arm was designed to induce exogenous variation in
the visibility of the recipient’s contributions, using the FEC search tool as
a medium.
As background, figure 1 reports the results of a survey described in
more detail in Section III.C. Figure 1A shows that contributors are aware
that contributions are public: 86 percent of respondents agreed with the
statement that contributions were a matter of public record.3 This high
awareness is not surprising, given that campaign committees are re-
quired to collect detailed information from individual contributors
and to explain that this information is required by the FEC’s disclosure
policy.4 By contrast, figure 1B shows that many contributors believe that
their neighbors do not know about the disclosure policy: 40 percent of
respondents believed that the majority of their neighbors thought that3 These figures correspond to responses from subjects in our sample of contributors
who did not receive any letter from us (besides the survey). Strictly speaking, some contri-
bution records are a matter of public record while others are not (e.g., records for contri-
butions of $200 or less are not reported to the FEC). The wording in the survey was very
general as we wanted to measure general awareness of the public nature of this informa-
tion rather than test the subjects on the details of the regulation. Appendix D presents
more details about the survey instrument, including a facsimile with the exact wording
of this question and of response options.
4 This awareness is also consistent with the internet browsing data discussed in app. E
indicating that the FEC’s search tool and other websites based on its information are widely
accessed.
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FIG. 1.—Contributors’ perception of the confidentiality of contributions (postelection
mail-in survey, No-Letter group). A, Perception of whether contribution records are con-
fidential/public (N 5 3,068). Answers to questions 4 and 5 from the questionnaire are
combined. B, Perception of the proportion of neighbors who believe that contribution rec-
ords are confidential/public (N 5 3,018). The figure is based on question 7 from the
questionnaire. For a copy of the questionnaire, see appendix D.This content downloaded from 128.032.010.164 on July 01, 2017 14:26:51 PM
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forming a contributor’s neighbors about how to access contribution rec-
ords may affect her perception of the visibility of her contributions.
We designed a type of letter, which we labeledWebsite, for the purpose
of providing information on how to use the FEC website to search for in-
dividual contributors (for a sample, see app. A.1). This flyer-like mail
piece consisted of a single sheet of paper that was folded and sealed to
form an envelope (see the sample in app. A.6). As with all the other types
of letters used in this experiment, we identified the research purpose of
thecommunication: “This letter ispartofastudyofpoliticalcampaigncon-
tributions made by individuals which is being conducted by researchers
atHarvardUniversity” (when thefield experimentwas conducted, Ricardo
Perez-Truglia was affiliated with Harvard University). The letters included
the URL of the project’s website, which provided basic information on the
project as well as contact information for the research team and for Har-
vard’s Institutional Review Board (see app. A.8 for the content of this site).
The main purpose of the site was to provide interested subjects with con-
textual information about our study and to clear up any doubts about its
legitimacy by placing emphasis on its academic and nonpartisan nature.
This Website letter contained a list that included the name of the re-
cipient and the five contributors nearest to the recipient’s address, along
with the party and the amount given by each of those listed.5 The recip-
ient of the letter was always the second name on the list; the full name of
the recipient was used (other contributors were identified only by first
name and initial of last name) and highlighted on the list. This short list
of contributors was included to draw the recipient’s attention to the con-
tent of the letter and to reinforce the perception that contribution rec-
ords are indeed publicly available by providing verifiable information.
The second paragraph of the letter identified the FEC as the source of
the information and explained that the name, address, and other details
about contributions were readily accessible online. That paragraph also
included the URL of the FEC’s search tool along with the statement that
the website could be used “to see which candidates or political parties
your neighbors, friends, family and co-workers are contributing to.”
We introduced exogenous variation in the visibility of the recipient’s
contributions by including two subtreatments: Website-Self and Website-
Neighbors. These two letter subtypes were identical in all aspects, except
for a message prominently displayed in a box located right below the list
of contributors stating the following:5 The m
who were c
 use subject Website-Self: “Your household was the only household randomly
chosen from your area to receive a letter of this type.”edian pairwise distance between the recipients and their five closest neighbors
ontributors was 0.35 mile.
This content downloaded from 128.032.010.164 on July 01, 2017 14:26:51 PM
to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
6 Specifi
population
the Websit
holds in th
the areas as
holds to be
Neighbors
was the sam
7 See, e.g
partisan interactions 000
All use subjWebsite-Neighbors: “Your household and other households in
your area were randomly chosen to receive a letter of this type.”This information was nondeceptive: we conducted the randomization
such that those receiving the Website-Self letter were the only ones in
their area to receive the letter, while there were multiple recipients of
theWebsite-Neighbors letter within an area.6 As a result, relative to recip-
ients of the Website-Self letters, recipients of Website-Neighbors letters
should have considered it more likely that their neighbors would use
the FEC search tool tomonitor their future contributions. In other words,
we interpret the difference between these two subtreatments as a differ-
ence in the perceived visibility of the recipients’ contribution.
To allow falsification tests for our key hypothesis, we added a treat-
ment arm called the Placebo letter, which had the same format as the
Website letter but presented only standard regulatory information about
contribution limits, taken verbatim from the FEC’s regulations. We did
not expect this information to have an effect on contributions because
these regulations are generally well known and, most importantly, be-
cause contribution limits were not binding for virtually all of the individ-
uals in our subject pool.73. Econometric FrameworkTo estimate the effect of higher visibility, we proceeded as follows. Let Yi
be a measure of the recipient’s posttreatment contributions. The econo-
metric specification is
Yi 5 b0  HigherVisibilityi 1 b1  HigherVisibilityi  ShareOwn-Partyi
1a  ShareOwn-Partyi 1 dXi 1 εi ,
(1)
where Higher Visibility is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if
the subject was assigned to the subtreatment Website-Neighbors and the
value of zero if she was assigned to the subtreatment Website-Self. Share
Own-Party is the proportion of the recipient’s neighbors who support
the recipient’s party, measured as the share of contributors in the recip-
ient’s three-digit zip code (ZIP-3) who contributed to the subjects’s partycally, we divided the United States into disjointed geographical areas of similar
. These areas were randomly assigned to one of two groups. In areas assigned to
e-Self treatment, exactly one household (randomly selected among all house-
e area in our FEC database of contributors) was sent a letter of this type. In
signed to the Website-Neighbors treatment, we randomly selected three house-
sent these letters, assigning more areas to the Website-Self than to the Website-
type so that the expected number of households receiving each subtreatment
e.
., fig. D.1.a in the appendix.
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the higher visibility treatment in a given area is given by b0 1 b1 
ShareOwn-Partyi. The conformity channel predicts that higher visibility
will discourage participation in areas where a vast majority of neighbors
support the opposite party (i.e., b0 < 0) but will encourage participation
in areas where the vast majority of neighbors support the same party
(i.e., b0 1 b1 > 0). Finally, Xi is a group of control variables such as the
pretreatment contributions made by the recipient (the inclusion of
these variables makes little difference for the results, as reported in
app. C).
It must be noted that Share Own-Party was not randomized as part
of the experiment. Thus, we rely on the assumption that there are no
other characteristics of the area of residence that affect the marginal ef-
fect of Higher Visibilityi and are correlated with Share Own-Partyi, that
is, E ½HigherVisibilityi  ShareOwn-Partyi  εi  5 0. We provide a series of
robustness checks related to this assumption in the empirical section
below.B. The Comparison Channel
1. HypothesesAccording to social norms theory, individuals are more motivated to en-
gage in prosocial behavior when they perceive peers are acting pro-
socially (Cialdini 1984; Akerlof and Kranton 2000), especially if the in-
dividual feels identified with these peers. Applying this framework to
campaign contributions, we hypothesize that individuals will contribute
more if other individuals of the same party make a larger contribution or
have a higher contribution rate.
Learning that others of the same party donate at a high rate could also
act to reduce an individual’s contributions as a result of free riding. For
instance, because of diminishing marginal returns, an individual’s mar-
ginal contribution has a smaller effect on the campaign when others give
more to her own party, thus making contributing less attractive.82. Experimental DesignWe devised a treatment arm called the List letter that provided informa-
tion about the behavior of other contributors in the recipient’s area.
A sample letter is presented in appendix A.3. The letter contained the
same contextual information as theWebsite letter regarding the purpose8 And a similar crowding out may also occur if individuals make campaign contributions
with the intention to buy access to politicians (e.g., Kalla and Broockman 2016).
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partisan interactions 000of the communication (research), the project’s website, and contact in-
formation. The bulk of the List letter, though, consisted of information
about presidential campaign contributions made by the recipient and by
nine other individuals from the recipient’s area of residence from April 1,
2011, to April 1, 2012.9 The information included, in table form, first
name, last name initials, party, and the amount contributed by each of
those listed.10 The recipient’s own contribution and name (highlighted)
were at the top of the list in order to draw the recipient’s attention and to
demonstrate the credibility of information. To facilitate the assimilation
of the information, contributions were ordered from highest to lowest
amounts, first for Democratic candidates and then for Republican can-
didates.
We used an algorithm that randomly selected the nine contributors to
be included in the table in order to introduce experimental variation in
the lists presented to the recipients. We first obtained the geolocation
for all individuals listed in our baseline FEC database. Then, for each
contributor i assigned a List letter, we identified the 30 closest contrib-
utors, Li, which we defined to be the individual’s neighbors.11 The nine
neighbors included in the table were selected from Li first by ordering
the contributors in Li according to a composite index and then by pick-
ing the top nine contributors from the ordered list. The value of the com-
posite index for a given neighbor j was a function of j ’s party, Party( j),
of the amount contributed by j during the preceding 12-month period,
Amount( j), and a set of constants, ei( j):
Indexi jð Þ 5 vDi  1 Party jð Þ 5 DEM½  1 vAi  Amount jð Þ 1 ei jð Þ: (2)
The parameters fvDi , vAi g are the recipient-specific weights assigned to
each of those dimensions. The vector ei (which was randomly generated)
dictates the order of the 30 neighbors in the baseline (i.e., where the two
weights are set to zero). The list of the top nine neighbors is a function of9 The median pairwise distance between the recipient and the nine neighboring con-
tributors was 1.2 miles.
10 Since the main purpose of this treatment arm is to study how contributors act when
they observe others rather than how they behave when they feel observed by others, we
tried to prevent, to the extent possible, recipients from feeling that their contribution ac-
tivity was more exposed to their neighbors because of our letter (e.g., by using only last
name initials and by not including the URL of the FEC search tool). It should be noted,
however, that the estimation of this treatment effect relies on within-arm variation (i.e.,
by comparing contributions of individuals who received the same letter type but with dif-
ferent information), and thus any visibility effect from the List letters should be netted out
by design.
11 The list Li is constructed on the basis of pairwise distances as the crow flies. These
neighboring contributors were selected from all FEC records, not only from our selected
subject pool. Only 0.08 percent of early contributors had simultaneously made contribu-
tions over $200 to the Obama campaign and to at least one of the Republican presidential
candidates. For the sake of simplicity, we excluded them from Li.
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Allthose parameters, denoted by g ðLi; vDi , vAi ; eiÞ. The baseline list refers to
the list of nine neighbors given by setting the two weights to zero, g(Li;
0, 0; ei). The weight assigned to the political party component was ran-
domly selected from three possible values: vDi 5 2cp, 0, and cp, with cp > 0.
Similarly, the weight assigned to the contribution amount was randomly
selected from three possible values: vAi 5 2ca , 0, and ca, with ca > 0. We
calibrated the distribution of the parameter values so that the average
characteristics of the lists were not biased relative to the baseline. We used
this index rather than simply selecting list members at random to ensure
sufficient variation in the statistics of interest.12 Note that the information
provided was not deceptive insofar as the letters stated that the table in-
cluded nine of the recipient’s neighbors and, given our definition of neigh-
bors, this claim always holds true.
This composite index induced exogenous variation in the contribu-
tion patterns shown in each List letter. Table 1 presents three possible
lists of nine neighbors generated by different combinations of the param-
eter weights. Panel A presents the baseline list (vDi 5 0, v
A
i 5 0). Panel B
presents the list obtained when the Democratic weight is assigned a neg-
ative value (vDi < 0, v
A
i 5 0): two of the Democratic contributors that ap-
pear on the baseline list are replaced by two Republican contributors. In
panel C, the weight on the amount is assigned a positive value (vDi 5 0,
vAi > 0): two of the Democrat contributors that appear on the baseline list
are replaced by two other Democrats who contributed higher amounts,
and one of the Republican contributors is replaced by one Republican
who contributed a higher amount. Note that the List letter did not con-
tain messages that would prime individuals to pay attention to a particu-
lar dimension of the information provided, such as the average contribu-
tion amount.133. Econometric FrameworkOur identification strategy does not rely on a comparison of posttreat-
ment contributions by individuals who received the List letters and those
who did not receive any letter. It relies, rather, on comparison between12 As a measure of how much exogenous variation was induced, the correlation between
the mean amount contributed in the actual table sent to the recipient and the mean
amount in the baseline table is about .75. See app. B.3 for additional details about the ran-
domization of neighbors included in the List letter.
13 Note that if individuals care about the contribution behavior of others, the equilib-
rium distribution of contributions will depend on how individuals form their perceptions
about the behavior of others. This question is particularly relevant to disclosure policies;
disseminating objective information, for instance, could correct biases in the formation
of beliefs. To explore this hypothesis, we randomized an additional feature of the List letter
(List-Once vs. List-Update). These additional features of the experimental design, and the
results they yielded, are presented in app. C.3.3.
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on the estimation of these effects. Imagine that we sent some contribu-
tors a table with an average contribution of $500 while we sent others a
table with an average contribution of $600. In that case, we could esti-
mate a regression of the posttreatment contributions on a variable that
takes the value of zero for the recipients randomly assigned to the $500 let-
ter and the value of 100 for the recipients assigned to the $600 letter. If the
estimated coefficient on that variable is 0.1, we would infer that each ad-
ditional dollar in average contributions shown in the letter caused the re-
cipient to contribute an additional $0.10.
We can generalize the above framework for the case in which we simul-
taneously randomize multiple dimensions of the information contained
in the letter. Let fi() represent some (possibly vector-valued) statistic of
the list shown to individual i, such as the mean contribution to the recip-
ient’s own party. Recall that Yi denotes the recipient’s posttreatment con-
tributions. The econometric specification is
Yi 5 b  Dfi 1 dX i 1 εi, (3)
where Dfi ; fi ðg ðLi; vDi , vAi ; εiÞÞ 2 fi ðg ðLi; 0, 0; εiÞÞ are the values of the sta-
tistics in the list shown to the individual compared to the values that would
have resulted if she had been assigned the baseline list (e.g., the mean
contribution in the list sent minus the mean contribution in the baseline
list). We wish to interpret the coefficient on Dfi as the causal effect of the
fi included in the list on the recipient’s posttreatment contributions.
The orthogonality assumption E ½Dfi  εi 5 0, required for causal in-
ference, implies that there are no omitted dimensions of the informa-TABLE 1
Identiﬁcation of Comparison Channel: Sample Treatment Lists
Generated with Different Parameter Values
A. Baseline
(vDi 5 0, v
A
i 5 0)
B. Low DEM
(vDi < 0, v
A
i 5 0)
C. High Amount
(vDi 5 0, v
A
i > 0)
Contributor Amount Party Contributor Amount Party Contributor Amount Party
G., R. $1,000 DEM G., R. $1,000 DEM G., R. $1,000 DEM
W., D. $500 DEM S., L., Y. $500 DEM H., J., B. $1,000 DEM
S., L., Y. $500 DEM A., S. $250 DEM P., R. $700 DEM
W., T., K. $500 DEM B., R. $250 DEM W., D. $500 DEM
A., S. $250 DEM W., S., B. $1,100 REP S., L., Y. $500 DEM
B., R. $250 DEM O., T., F. $800 REP W., T., K. $500 DEM
W., S., B. $1,100 REP B., M., A. $400 REP W., S., B. $1,100 REP
B., M., A. $400 REP A., E., A. $250 REP O., T., F. $800 REP
A., E., A. $250 REP H., V. $250 REP B., M., A. $400 REPThis content do
All use subject to University of Cwnloaded from 128.032.010.164 
hicago Press Terms and Conditioon July 01, 201
ns (http://www7 14:26:5
.journals.Note.—Example of how the algorithm generates different lists of nine neighbors from
a given sample of the recipient’s 30 closest contributing neighbors. See Sec. IV.B for a de-
tailed description of the algorithm.1 PM
uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
000 journal of political economy
Alltion about the list that can affect the recipient’s contributions that are
correlated with the characteristics included in the regression equation.
For instance, recipients may care about both the mean contribution
amount and the maximum contribution in the list, which are likely to
be correlated. Including only themean in the regression equation would
yield a biased estimate, because its coefficient would pick up part of the
effects of the maximum contribution. An advantage of our research de-
sign is that, as econometricians, we observe the same information as our
subjects, and thus we can include in the analysis additional dimensions
of the list that we believe might be driving the results.III. Data Sources and Implementation of the
Field Experiment
A. Subject Pool and Data SourcesOur subject pool was based on a subsample of the FEC contribution rec-
ords, specifically, some 280,456 individuals who had made over $200 in
contributions to a presidential campaign committee from April 1, 2011,
to April 1, 2012, drawn from the online FEC records as of April 25, 2012.
While the FEC’s records are remarkably comprehensive, there were some
instances of missing or inconsistent information. Since the number of in-
dividuals in this initial sample was substantially higher than the number
of subjects needed for our experiment, we adopted a conservative ap-
proach and limited the subject pool to those individuals for whom the
highest-quality information was available (e.g., quality of address infor-
mation). We applied a number of additional arbitrary criteria, such as ex-
cluding contributors fromWashington, DC, and those geographically iso-
lated fromother contributors (formore details, see app. B). After applying
these criteria, our final subject pool consisted of 191,832 individuals.14
Appendix B provides descriptive statistics and shows that the observable
characteristics of our subject pool are similar to those of the universe of in-
dividuals who contributed during the 2012 presidential campaign.
Of the 191,832 contributors in the subject pool, 91,998 were randomly
assigned to be sent a letter: 36,773 were sent a Website letter, 36,795 a List
letter, and 18,430 a Placebo letter. Within each treatment arm, we ran-
domly assigned them to the subtreatments described in the previous sec-
tion (e.g., Website-Self and Website-Neighbors). We refer to the 99,834 in-14 The sample also excludes 1,002 individuals who were sent letters later deemed unde-
liverable or redirected by the US Postal Service (the results are robust to the inclusion of
these observations, as reported in app. C). We took several measures to clean the address
information in the FEC database, including geocoding, cross-checking an individual’s in-
formation across different records, and matching the data with the USPS National Change
of Address database.
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partisan interactions 000dividuals who were not assigned a letter as the No-Letter group. The ran-
dom assignment was conducted at the household level and was stratified
at the ZIP-3 level.15 Appendix B shows that the treatment groups are bal-
anced in observable pretreatment characteristics, as we would expect from
the random assignment to treatments. Finally, since contributors to the
Rand Paul primary (constituting 12 percent of the original sample) made
virtually no contributions in the posttreatment period to the Romney
presidential campaign, our baseline results exclude this group. The re-
sults are robust to inclusion of this group in the analysis, as shown in ap-
pendix C.1.3.B. Timing of the Experiment and Outcomes of InterestThe letters were sent onMay 6, 2012, 4 days after the Republican National
Committee declared Mitt Romney the party’s presumptive nominee. The
outcome variable was simplified by sending the letters once each party
had a single presidential candidate, which meant we did not have to com-
pare contributions from the same individual to different candidates. Un-
less stated otherwise, the outcomes of interest throughout our study are
the individual campaign contributions made to the Obama or Romney
committee from the estimated mail delivery until the official end of the
election cycle, that is, December 31, 2012.16 We label these “posttreatment”
contributions. The “pretreatment” contributions, which were used in fal-
sification tests, correspond to total contributions made between April 1,
2011, and the date when the letters were delivered.
In the pretreatment period, 52 percent of individuals in the No-Letter
group contributed to Obama and the remaining to Republican candi-
dates. The average amount contributed during the pretreatment period
was $524. During the posttreatment period, 48.9 percent of our subjects
made at least one contribution. For those who made contributions dur-
ing the posttreatment period, the average amount contributed was $587.
For more details about the contribution patterns of subjects, see appen-
dix B.2. When the dependent variable in the regressions presented below
is the amount of posttreatment contributions, we use an interval regres-
sionmodel to take into account the censored nature of this outcome: be-
cause of the disclosure threshold, for any Republican subject who did not
make a pretreatment contribution to Romney, the absence of recorded
contributions to Romney in the posttreatment period implies that she15 That is, all household members were assigned to the same treatment group. About
96 percent of the households in the subject pool included only one contributor.
16 In practice, there were virtually no contributions shortly after election day, Novem-
ber 6, 2012. For individuals in the No-Letter group, we defined the date dividing pre-
and posttreatment contributions as the median date when other letters were delivered
in their five-digit zip code (see app. B for details).
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Allmust have contributed to Romney anywhere between $0 and $200. As
shown in appendix C, the results are very similar using other regression
models.C. Postelection Mail-In SurveyData for the key outcome variable, the recipient’s posttreatment contri-
butions, were obtained from the FEC administrative records. Additionally,
we conducted a mail-in survey with a subsample of our subjects with two
goals. The first goal was to provide some descriptive evidence to comple-
ment the experimental results. The second goal was to adjust and aid
the interpretation of the magnitudes of the effects identified by our mail-
ing experiment, which are attenuated by the fact that not all subjects read
the letter that was sent to them.
The survey included five questions about knowledge of campaign fi-
nance law and a final subjective question about how much an individual
should contribute to presidential campaigns. The envelope contained a
letter, a survey questionnaire, and a prepaid business reply envelope. Re-
cipients were asked to fill out the survey and mail it back in the envelope
provided.17 We sent the envelopes on December 6, 2012, 1 month after
the date of the 2012 presidential election, because we did not want any
of the information contained in the survey mail piece to contaminate
the effects of the letters sent in the experiment. The intended recipients,
44,380 in total, were a random sample of individuals from the No-Letter
and Website groups. We received 9,414 responses, which implies a re-
sponse rate of 21.21 percent (this response rate was statistically indistin-
guishable between subjects from the No-Letter and the Website letter
treatment groups). Appendix D presents the survey instrument and pro-
vides further details on this survey and its response rate.IV. Experimental Results
A. The Conformity ChannelFigure 2 depicts the effect of Higher Visibility on the probability of mak-
ing a contribution in the posttreatment period for different values of
Share Own-Party, in the spirit of a partial regression plot. Each dot cor-
responds to one decile of the distribution of Share Own-Party, with its
position in the horizontal axis corresponding to the mean value of Share
Own-Party in that decile. Thus, the horizontal dispersion of the dots re-
flects thedistributionof ShareOwn-Party. Foreachdot, theposition in the17 As an incentive for participation, we included prizes awarded by lottery to individuals
who mailed in the completed survey before January 31, 2013 (for details, see app. D).
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partisan interactions 000vertical axis corresponds to the average effect of the Higher Visibility inter-
vention on the probability of making posttreatment contributions within
the corresponding decile of Share Own-Party (see the notes to fig. 2 for
estimation details). The results are consistent with the prediction of the
conformity channel: when the majority of a subject’s neighbors support
her party, higher visibility increases the probability that she will make a
contribution; when supporters are evenly split between the two parties,
higher visibility has no effect on the likelihood of contributing; and when
most of a subject’s neighbors support the opposite party, higher visibility
decreases the probability of a subject making a contribution. Moreover,
this partial regression plot suggests that the effect of Higher Visibility in-FIG. 2.—Effect of higher visibility on the probability that the recipient makes a post-
treatment contribution, by partisan composition of the recipient’s area; N 5 32,070. Ob-
servations are taken from subjects assigned to the Website letter. The dots in the figure cor-
respond to a binned scatter plot representation of the partial regression plot. Each dot
corresponds to one decile of the distribution of Share Own-Party, with its position in the hor-
izontal axis corresponding to themean value of ShareOwn-Party in that decile. For each dot,
the position in the vertical axis corresponds to the average effect of the Higher Visibility in-
tervention on the probability of making posttreatment contributions within the correspond-
ing decile of Share Own-Party, with confidence intervals based on heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors. The regression line corresponds to the linear relationship between the two var-
iables. The binned scatter plot was estimated from a regression of an indicator of whether the
individual made a posttreatment contribution on a dummy for whether the subject was as-
signed the Website-Neighbors subtreatment, dummies for the deciles of Share Own-Party,
the interaction between the two latter sets of dummies, and a set of individual-level controls
(for more details about the regression, see the note to table 2).This content downloaded from 128.032.010.164 on July 01, 2017 14:26:51 PM
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Allcreases roughly linearly with Share Own-Party, which validates the linear
specification used in the rest of the analysis.18
Table 2 presents the baseline results in regression form, along with a
number of robustness checks. The results in column 1 present the effects
of the higher visibility treatment on the amount contributed during the
posttreatment period. The negative coefficient on Higher Visibility indi-
cates that the treatment reduces participation in areas where everyone
supports the party that the recipient opposes, while the significant positive
coefficient on the interaction between Higher Visibility and Share Own-
Party indicates that the effect of the higher visibility treatment ismore pos-
itive (or less negative) when Share Own-Party is higher. These coefficients
can be used to estimate the effects of the higher visibility treatment in
areas with different values of Share Own-Party. For instance, consider a
ZIP-3 in which 75 percent of contributors support the majority party. Our
results indicate that, in such areas, higher visibility would reduce by about
$53 the amount contributed by supporters of the minority party and in-
crease by about $19 the amount contributed by supporters of the major-
ity party. These effects are not only statistically but also economically sig-
nificant. The effects of $53 and $19 constitute, respectively, 9.0 percent
and 3.2 percent of the average amount contributed by subjects who made
further contributions during the posttreatment period ($587).
Column 7 in table 2 reproduces the results from column 1 but with the
probability of making at least one posttreatment contribution, rather than
the amount contributed, as the dependent variable. The sign and statis-
tical significance of the coefficients are consistent with the results from
column 1. In areas where 75 percent of neighbors support the majority
party, the higher visibility treatment reduces the probability of contribut-
ing by 1.86 percentage points among supporters of the minority party and
increases the probability of contributing by 1.47 percentage points among
supporters of the majority party. These effects of 1.86 and 1.47 percent-
age points represent, respectively, 3.3 percent and 2.6 percent of the base-
line contribution rate of 55.7 percent.
A simple and straightforward way to check the randomness of treat-
ment assignment is to compute the “effects” of our experiment on pre-
treatment, rather than posttreatment, contributions. Column 8 in table 2
presents the results from this falsification test. As expected, the higher
visibility treatment had no “effect” on pretreatment contributions: the es-
timates of the coefficients on Higher Visibility and on its interaction with
Share Own-Party are very close to zero, are not statistically significant, and
are precisely estimated.18 Formally, we test the joint hypothesis that all of the binned scatter points from fig. 2
are equal to the corresponding points in the regression line (p -value 5 .996).
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000 journal of political economy
AllOne potential concern with our findings is that the heterogeneous ef-
fects of higher visibility by partisan alignment may reflect heterogeneity
in other area characteristics that are correlated with partisan alignment.
Columns 2 and 3 of table 2 present some robustness checks. Column 2
includes the interaction between Higher Visibility and the share of indi-
viduals of the same race as the recipient’s in her ZIP-3 (based on the cat-
egories white and nonwhite). The results suggest that there is no signifi-
cant heterogeneity in the effect of Higher Visibility with respect to Share
Own-Race: the coefficient on the interaction (229.09, standard error
[SE] 48.02) is close to zero, is not statistically significant, and is more pre-
cisely estimated than (and statistically significantly different from) the in-
teraction with Share Own-Party.19 In turn, column 3 includes an interac-
tion between Higher Visibility and Share Low-Income, defined as the share
of low-income households in the recipient’s area. As expected, the coef-
ficient on the interaction with Share Low-Income is close to zero and is not
statistically significant. Furthermore, we find similar results when we in-
clude interactions with other characteristics of the recipient’s area of res-
idence, such as the share of college graduates and married individuals (re-
sults reported in app. C).
The share of Democrats (or Republicans) in a given ZIP-3 is signifi-
cantly correlated to a number of characteristics of the area’s population
such as average income, race, and education. If our analysis focused on
the interaction between Higher Visibility and Share Democrat, there
would then be a potential omitted variable bias from these other ZIP-3
characteristics. However, our analysis is based on the alignment of the
subject with respect to the political composition of her area. This differ-
ence is subtle but important, because the same ZIP-3 characteristics that
are correlated to Share Democrat (or Share Republican) are only weakly
correlated with the alignment variable, ShareOwn-Party, leaving less room
for potential omitted variable biases. For instance, the correlation between
Share Democrat and Share Low-Income is .275 (p -value < .01), whereas the
correlation between Share Own-Party and Share Low-Income is only .033
(p -value < .01).
As an additional falsification test, column 4 of table 2 presents the re-
sults from a specification in which we replace the Higher Visibility with
the Placebo treatment indicator. As expected, there is no significant het-
erogeneity with respect to Share Own-Party in the response to the Placebo
letter: the coefficient on the interaction between Placebo and Share Own-
Party (28.99, SE 46.75) is close to zero, is not statistically significant, is pre-19 From the FEC data, we could also use our proxy for gender to construct a variable re-
flecting the share of individuals of the same gender in the same ZIP-3. However, there is
very little variation in this variable across ZIP-3s, and it is thus impossible to precisely esti-
mate the coefficient on this interaction.
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partisan interactions 000cisely estimated, and also is statistically different from the corresponding
coefficient from column 1 on the interaction between Higher Visibility and
Share Own-Party (143.50, SE 60.30).
We can also explore the timing of the effects of higher visibility. Col-
umns 5 and 6 of table 2 show the effects of higher visibility on the post-
treatment amount contributed before and after September 1, 2012, re-
spectively. The effects of the higher visibility treatment faded over time:
the coefficient on the interaction between Higher Visibility and Share
Own-Party decreases by 73 percent (i.e., from 149.04 to 40.84) from the
first to the second half of the posttreatment period, and this difference
is marginally statistically significant (p -value < .10).
Appendix C presents a number of additional robustness and specifica-
tion checks, such as showing that the results are very similar with alterna-
tive clustering of standard errors and when using Tobit or Poisson regres-
sions instead of interval regressions.
While the impact of our higher visibility treatment is consistent with
the presence of conformity effects, some alternative interpretations of
our results are worthy of discussion. The first is that individuals may use
campaign contributions to send signals about characteristics that are not
of a partisan nature—for instance, to signal wealth, generosity, or level of
civic engagement. The second is that individuals may give more if they
feel observed by neighbors because they believe that others will follow
their lead and, in turn, contribute more themselves. However, neither of
these accounts can explain our finding of a negative effect of higher visi-
bility on contributions for supporters of the local minority party.
The results provide estimates of the effect of having been mailed a let-
ter with certain information, which we denominate the intention to treat
(ITT) effect. To assess the importance of higher visibility would require
estimating the effect of reading the letter, which we denominate the treat-
ment on the treated (TOT) effect. The ITT effects can be scaled up to
TOT effects using the inverse of the reading rate r (i.e., the proportion
of recipients who actually read the letters we sent): TOT 5 (1/r)ITT. A
substantial share of experimental subjects—probably a majority—may not
have read the letters we sent them: our mailing was sent in the middle of
the presidential campaign, when potential voters, especially those who
had made contributions before, were being flooded by large amounts of
mailings soliciting campaign contributions and providing information
about the candidates and the election. While we attempted to make our
mail piece standout, so did the candidates’ campaign committees. In par-
ticular, for cost reasons, our mail piece consisted of a folded flyer, which
tend to stand out less than regular envelopes.
For our statistical power calculations, we consulted mass-marketing ex-
perts who provided us with estimates for our mail piece’s expected read-
ing rate. These estimates ranged from 10 percent to 25 percent, whichThis content downloaded from 128.032.010.164 on July 01, 2017 14:26:51 PM
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Allexplains why we used such a large sample for conducting the experi-
ment. Indeed, this range of estimates is between the conservative lower
and upper bounds given by statistics about unsolicited mail and the num-
ber of visits to the project’s website.20 To get a more precise and objec-
tive measurement of the reading rate, we turn to our postelection mail-
in survey.
Figure 3 compares the distribution of beliefs about the public nature
of contribution records between survey respondents who were selected
not to receive any letter (the No-Letter group) and recipients of our Web-
site letters. As expected, respondents who had received a Website letter
were significantly less likely to report being unsure about the public na-
ture of contribution records. More precisely, the share of respondents
who were unsure about the public nature of contribution declined from
19.2 percentage points in the No-Letter group to 15.8 percentage points
in the Website group. Assuming that a subject who had read the letter
would always report certainty about the disclosure policy, that difference
of 21.5 percent implies a reading rate of r5 0.215 (with a 90 percent con-
fidence interval of 0.146–0.284). Reassuringly, this estimate of the read-
ing rate is within the range of estimates provided by our mass-mailing ex-
perts.21
We can use the estimated reading rate to scale up the magnitude of the
effects of higher visibility. Our results indicated that, in an area where
75 percent of the population supports one party, the higher visibility treat-
ment induced a drop in the amount contributed posttreatment of 9.0 per-
cent of the mean amount for recipients supporting the local minority party
and an increase of 3.2 percent for recipients supporting the local major-
ity. The scale-up factor of 4.6 (i.e., 1/0.215) implied by the reading rate,
however, indicates that the TOTeffects were substantially larger:241 per-
cent (i.e.,29.0 percent 4.6) and 15 percent (i.e., 3.2 percent 4.6), re-
spectively.22 Even with a reading rate twice as high, the effects of higher vis-
ibility would still be very large. Appendix D.2 presents a formal discussion20 The US Environmental Protection Agency indicates that 44 percent of unsolicited
mail is discarded before being opened, which provides a conservative upper bound on
the reading rate (source: US Environmental Protection Agency, “EPA Junk Mail Reduc-
tion,” June 28, 2006). On the other hand, visitors to our project’s website account for 5 per-
cent of the letters we sent, which in turn provides a conservative lower bound for the read-
ing rate.
21 The response rate to the mail-in survey, 21.2 percent, suggests that its reading rate was
probably much higher than that of the original treatment letters. This difference can be ex-
plained by the very different conditions under which the mail-in survey was sent, i.e., after
the presidential election (see app. D.2 for a detailed discussion).
22 This estimate corresponds to the split-sample instrumental variable estimation (Angrist and
Krueger 1992). Following Dee and Evans (2003), we can compute standard errors using the
deltamethod: the TOTeffects of241 percent and 15 percent have standard errors of 19.9 per-
cent and 10.6 percent, respectively.
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partisan interactions 000of the implicit assumptions in this exercise, and it discusses some qualifica-
tions, robustness checks, and alternative estimators.B. The Comparison ChannelThe evidence about the comparison channel is based on the sample of
subjects who were sent letters of the List type. The estimation is given by
equation (3), which consists of regressing the posttreatment contribu-
tions on the characteristics of the table of contributors included in the
letter: the average amount contributed to the recipient’s own party (cown)
and to the opposite party (copp), as well as the number of contributors to
the recipient’s party on the list (Nown).
Figure 4 presents the evidence in graphical form, based on the same
type of partial regression plots used in the previous section. The dots in
the two figures correspond to binned scatter plot representations of the
partial regression plots. Each dot corresponds to one quintile of the dis-
tribution of the horizontal axis variable, with its position in the horizontalFIG. 3.—Effect of the website letter on the belief that contribution records are confiden-
tial/public (postelection mail-in survey); N 5 9,414. Histograms of responses to the post-
election mail-in survey. No-Letter corresponds to respondents who did not receive any let-
ter during the experimental stage, while the Website group corresponds to respondents
who received a Website-Self or a Website-Neighbors letter. This measure of perception
of the public nature of contribution records combines the answer to a first question about
disclosure policy and the answer to a second question about the respondent’s confidence
in that first answer (questions 4 and 5 from the questionnaire in app. A.7, respectively).This content downloaded from 128.032.010.164 on July 01, 2017 14:26:51 PM
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AllFIG. 4.—Effect of information from the List letter on posttreatment contribution amount;
N 5 36,795. A, Effect of mean contributed amount own-party. B, Effect of number of own-
party contributions. Binned scatter plots of effects of information on the posttreatment con-
tribution amount. Regressions include the usual set of individual-level controls (see the
notes to table 2). Additionally, the regression from panel A controls for copp and Nown, while
the regression from panel B controls for cown and copp. Confidence intervals are based on
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.This content downloaded from 128.032.010.164 on July 01, 2017 14:26:51 PM
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partisan interactions 000axis corresponding to the mean value of the variable in that quintile. For
eachdot, the position in the vertical axis corresponds to the average effect
of the intervention on the posttreatment contribution amount. The regres-
sion line corresponds to the linear relationship between the two variables.
The binned scatter plot was estimated from an interval regression of the
posttreatment amounts contributed on a set of dummies corresponding
to the quintiles of the variables on the x-axis, with the coefficients for the
middle categories normalized to zero—more specifically, corresponding
to the difference between the value of this variable computed with the
list sent to the recipient and the corresponding value computed in the
baseline list. Figure 4A corresponds to the effect of cown, holding constant
copp and Nown. The evidence suggests that recipients contribute more the
higher the mean of contributions from supporters of their own party. Fig-
ure 4B corresponds to the effect of Nown, holding constant cown and copp.
This evidence suggests that individuals contribute less when the list we
mailed had a larger number of contributors to their own party. Further-
more, these results suggest that a linear specification is a good approx-
imation to the relationship between contributions and both cown and
Nown.23
Table 3 presents further regression results. The specification in col-
umn 1 includes as independent variables the average amount contrib-
uted to the recipient’s own party (cown) and the average amount contrib-
uted to her opposite party (copp). These independent variables were
defined in hundreds of dollars. The coefficient on cown indicates that
for each $100 increase in this variable, there is a statistically significant
increase in the recipient’s own contributions of about $2.95 (p -value <
.05). While we cannot discard other interpretations, this evidence is con-
sistent with models of social norms, which predict that individuals con-
tribute more if they perceive that similar individuals (i.e., geographically
close individuals supporting the same party) contributed, on average,
higher amounts. In contrast, the coefficient on the contributions of neigh-
bors who support the opposite party indicates that an increase of $100
in copp has an effect on the subject’s contribution of just $0.06 (p -value >
.10), which is both statistically and economically insignificant. Moreover,
the difference between the two coefficients is marginally statistically dif-
ferent from zero (p -value5 .096). This finding is also consistent with iden-
tity theories (Akerlof and Kranton 2000), according to which individuals
do not follow the behavior of peers with whom they do not identify.
Like conformity effects, these comparison effects are ITTestimates, since
we do not know which recipients actually read the letters. According to the23 Formally, we test the joint hypothesis that all of the binned scatter points from fig. 4A
(4B) are equal to the corresponding points in the regression line: p -value5 .967 (p -value5
.634).
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Allcalculations inSectionIV.A, theTOTeffectmaybe4.6timesgreater thanthe
ITT effect. This would imply that for each $100 increase in cown, the
recipients who actually read the letter increased their contributions by
$13.57 (i.e., 2.95  4.6).
To provide complementary evidence on the economic significance of
social norms, we included a question in the postelection survey intended
to quantify the respondent’s perception of the contribution norm. This
question asked how much an individual earning an average income
should contribute to a presidential campaign (question 8 in the survey’sTABLE 3
Evidence on the Comparison Channel
Posttreatment Contributions Pretreatment
$
(1)
$
(2)
$
(3)
$
(4)
P($ > 0)
(5)
$
(6)
Average amount
contributed
by own-party
contributors
(cown)
2.95** 3.20** 1.75 2.48** .05 .90
(1.47) (1.47) (1.22) (1.17) (.06) (.91)
Average amount
contributed by
opposite-party
contributors
(copp)
.06 2.40 2.01 2.41 2.05 .06
(.92) (.96) (.74) (.78) (.04) (.58)
Number of own-
party contributors
(Nown)
25.44* 26.19*** 2.47 2.16 1.59
(2.86) (2.24) (2.30) (.13) (1.75)
Regression method Interval Interval Interval Interval OLS OLS
Subperiod ≤ Sept. 1 > Sept. 1
Mean outcome $338 $338 $168 $171 56% $527This cont
 use subject to Universient downloaded from 128.032.010.164 on July 01, 2017 1
ty of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.joNote.—N 5 31,996. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Ob-
servations are from subjects assigned to the List letter. The dependent variable in cols. 1
and 2 is the amount contributed during the posttreatment period. The dependent variable
in col. 3 takes the value of 100 if the individual made at least one posttreatment contribu-
tion and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in col. 4 is the dollar amount contributed
during the pretreatment period. All the independent variables except Nown are expressed
in hundreds of dollars (i.e., the estimates correspond to effects of $100 changes in the in-
dependent variables). The term cown (conversely, copp) corresponds to the average contribu-
tion of all the individuals in the letter’s table who contributed to the recipient’s own (con-
versely, other) party. The termNown is the number of individuals in the table who contributed
to the recipient’s party. These independent variables are included in the regression as the
difference between the value computed with the list sent to the recipient and the correspond-
ing value computed in the baseline list. The outcome variables in cols. 3 and 4 correspond to
two disjoint sets of the posttreatment period: before and after September 1, 2012. See online
table B.4 for descriptive statistics for all these independent variables. All the regressions ex-
cept for the one in col. 6 include the usual control variables: the time it took for delivery of
themail piece and a set of variables with pretreatment contributions to each candidate.Mean
outcome corresponds to the average of the outcome variable.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.4:26:51 PM
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partisan interactions 000questionnaire, presented in app. A.7). By matching the responses to this
question to the FEC records, we can measure the relationship between
the perceived social norm and the actual contributions made by respon-
dents during the 2012 presidential campaign. Figure 5 depicts this rela-
tionship for responses from individuals in the No-Letter group. As ex-
pected, there is a significant positive relationship between the perceived
contribution norm and actual contributions: a $100 increase in the per-
ceived norm is associated with an extra $11.21 (p -value < .01) in contri-
butions. Of course, this observational evidence is subject to a number of
identification challenges. With that caveat in mind, this auxiliary result
suggests that the effects of social norms in a nonexperimental setting are
of the same order of magnitude as those suggested by the experimental
evidence.
Column 2 of table 3 presents the results from a specification that in-
cludes as an independent variable the number of individuals on the listFIG. 5.—Relationship between self-reported contribution norm and actual amount con-
tributed (postelection mail-in survey); N 5 3,018. The figure is based on a combination of
responses to the postelection mail-in survey from subjects in the No-Letter group and data
on those respondents’ contributions during the entire 2012 presidential campaign cycle
(from FEC records). The horizontal axis represents the quintiles of the distribution of re-
sponses to the survey question about how much individuals “should” contribute to a pres-
idential campaign (question 8 from the questionnaire in app. A.7). The vertical axis rep-
resents the average amount contributed by respondents during the presidential election
cycle.This content downloaded from 128.032.010.164 on July 01, 2017 14:26:51 PM
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Allwho contributed to the recipient’s party (Nown), in addition to the average
amounts contributed to the recipient’s own and to the opposite party, cown
and copp. Social norms theory predicts that a higher value of Nown should
increase the recipient’s contribution because individuals feel pressured
to behave like the majority. The negative and statistically significant co-
efficient on Nown in column 2 suggests that, to the contrary, the effect op-
erates in the opposite direction, which could be interpreted as a form of
free riding. For each additional individual supporting the same party on
the list, the recipient reduced the amount of her contribution by $5.44
(p -value < .10). The magnitude of this effect is equivalent to the effect of
decreasing the mean contribution of own-party neighbors by $170.
As with conformity effects, a first robustness test is to check the ran-
domness of the treatment assignment by estimating the effects of our ex-
periment on pretreatment contributions. The specification in column 6
of table 3 presents the results of this falsification test. As expected, all of
the coefficients are close to zero and are not statistically significant. This
evidence is consistent with the assumption that the effects are identified
by the experimental assignment (see app. C.3 for additional robustness
checks).
We can quantify the effects of the information about contribution pat-
terns on the extensive margin of contributions as well. The specification
in column 5 of table 3 is the same as in column 2, with the only difference
that the dependent variable is the probability of making at least one post-
treatment contribution. The relevant coefficients from column 5 are small
in magnitude and not statistically significant, indicating no statistical ev-
idence of comparison effects on the extensive margin.
Columns 3 and 4 in table 3 consider the effects on the amount con-
tributed during the two posttreatment subperiods: before and after Sep-
tember 1, 2012. The estimates suggest that cown had a lasting effect: the
coefficients are similar for the two subperiods (1.75 and 2.48), and their
difference is not statistically significant. The effect of Nown, however, lasted
only for the first half of the posttreatment period: the coefficient onNown is
statistically significant during the first subperiod (26.19, p -value < .01) but
close to zero and not statistically significant during the second half of the
posttreatment period (20.47, p -value > .10), and the difference between
the two periods is statistically significant. One potential explanation for
this finding is that, as the election neared, the recipients obtained new in-
formation about the total contributions to the two presidential campaigns
that overrode the information provided in our letter. Indeed, information
about the total contributions raised by both campaigns was periodically
reported on and discussed in the media during the election cycle.
Appendix C presents a number of additional robustness and specifica-
tion checks, such as showing that the results are very similar with alterna-This content downloaded from 128.032.010.164 on July 01, 2017 14:26:51 PM
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partisan interactions 000tive clustering of standard errors and when using Tobit or Poisson regres-
sions instead of the interval regressions.V. Counterfactual Analysis of the Conformity and
Comparison Effects on Geographic Polarization
A. Implications of the Conformity ChannelIn this section, we present some back-of-the-envelope calculations of the
counterfactual distribution of contributions in a scenario with no confor-
mity effects, based on the experimental estimates.
Let Pkz be the probability that an individual from ZIP-3 area z ∈
f1, 2, ::: , Zg makes a contribution to a presidential candidate of party k
∈ {DEM, REP}, and let ~Pkz be the corresponding probability in the coun-
terfactual scenario with no conformity effects. Let u ∈ ½0, 1 be the prob-
ability that a randomly selected neighbor from the same ZIP-3 area ob-
serves another neighbor’s campaign contributions. We can parameterize
the conformity effects in a simple way:
Pkz 5 ~P
k
z 1 1 g1  u 
~Pkz
ok ~Pkz
2 g0
 !" #
8 i, z, k, (4)
where the parameter g1 > 0 represents the intensity of conformity effects,
and the parameter g0 ∈ [0, 1] represents their degree of symmetry.24 The
symmetric case, g0 5 ½, corresponds to the patterns we observe in the
data: when neighbors are evenly split between the two parties, the con-
formity channel does not affect contributions; but in areas with more
uneven distributions of political preferences, the conformity channel in-
creases contributions to the majority party and decreases contributions
to the minority party.
Let P and ~P denote the vectors with all Pkz ’s and ~P
k
z ’s. Given fP , g0, g1  ug,
we obtain the counterfactual probabilities ~P by numerically solving the
system of nonlinear equations given by (4). Thus, this counterfactual anal-
ysis simply requires estimates for fP , g0, g1  ug (note that we need only the
product g1  u, and not each of these parameters separately).
We use the vector of observed shares of contributors in each ZIP-3 dur-
ing the 2012 presidential election as the estimate of P, and we estimate
the values of g0 and g1  u using the experimental findings. The value of
g0 corresponds to the value of Share Own-Party for which an increase in24 More precisely, we should be using ~Pk2i,z , the probability of contributions excluding i’s
own, instead of ~Pkz . This approximation error is virtually zero because there are hundreds
of thousands of individuals in each ZIP-3 area. We are also implicitly assuming that the pa-
rameters are bounded such that the resulting probabilities are between zero and one.
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Allvisibility would not affect the probability of contributing.25 The estimates
from column 7 of table 2 imply an estimate of g0 5 0.53 (i.e., 23.53 1
6.67  0.53 5 0). In turn, the parameter g1 corresponds to the effect of
visibility on contributions between the extreme cases of areas with all
own-party neighbors and all opposite-party neighbors. However, our ex-
perimental results correspond to the effects of an intervention that in-
creased visibility by some unknown degree, Du, rather than from zero
to one. Thus, we need to take the coefficient on the interaction between
Higher Visibility and Share Own-Party and scale it up by dividing it by Du.
The results from column 7 of table 2 imply
g1 5
6:67
56  0:215  Du 5
0:55
Du
:
In turn, this implies g1  u 5 0:55  ðu=DuÞ. Thus, the only remaining
unknown to complete the counterfactual analysis is Du=u, that is, the
proportional increase in visibility that resulted from our higher visibil-
ity treatment. We do not have a direct measure of Du=u nor of either of
its components. Instead, we present some baseline results based on the
case of Du=u 5 1 (i.e., our intervention doubled the visibility of contri-
butions among neighbors) and discuss the results under alternative as-
sumptions.26
Figure 6A presents the actual and counterfactual distributions of con-
tributors as a function of the share of contributors to the Democratic
Party. The solid bars represent the histogram of the actual shares of
Democrat contributors across ZIP-3s. The dispersion of this variable is
intrinsically related to the degree of geographic clustering of contribu-
tors (i.e., the extent to which active Democrats are located near other
active Democrats), which is also known as geographic polarization.27
The main driver of this geographic polarization of contributors is the
sorting of individuals into areas with a higher share of like-minded peers.
Additionally, once individuals are sorted into geographical areas, the con-
formity effects can exacerbate polarization by increasing the participation25 Note that our experimental estimates correspond to the probability of making a post-
treatment contribution conditional on having contributed during the first half of the elec-
tion (the pretreatment period). Instead, this counterfactual analysis is based on the uncon-
ditional probability of making a contribution. This exercise thus relies on the assumption
that, in proportional terms, the magnitude of the conformity effects is similar between
these conditional and unconditional probabilities.
26 The visibility could have increased as a result of several factors: for instance, because
of an increase in neighbors’ awareness of the FEC online search tool, but also because of a
higher salience of this information. We are also making a series of additional implicit as-
sumptions: e.g., we do not take into account the potential equilibrium effects that can arise
from a signaling model, and we are not dealing explicitly with individuals who contribute
to both parties.
27 For a formal discussion of this relationship, see Perez-Truglia (forthcoming). For more
information on polarization measurement, see Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy (2015).
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FIG. 6.—Counterfactual analysis of the comparison and conformity effects on geographic
polarization. A, Conformity channel (N 5 31,996). B, Comparison channel (N 5 32,070). In
panel A, the solid bars correspond to the actual distribution of the share of Democratic con-
tributors across ZIP-3 areas during the 2012 presidential campaign cycle, and the hollowbars
correspond to the counterfactual distribution in a scenario with no conformity effects. In
panel B, the solid bars correspond to the actual distribution of the share of Democratic con-
tributions across ZIP-3 areas during the 2012 presidential campaign cycle, and the hollow
bars correspond to the counterfactual distribution in a scenario with no comparison effects.This content downloaded from 128.032.010.164 on July 01, 2017 14:26:51 PM
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Allof supporters of the local majority and reducing the participation of the
local minority.
The hollow bars from figure 6A correspond to the distribution of con-
tributors in the counterfactual scenario with no conformity effects, assum-
ing Du=u 5 1. The mean of the distribution is roughly the same (0.55)
in the factual and counterfactual scenarios. However, the dispersion of
the actual distribution (standard deviation of 0.170) is significantly larger
than that of the counterfactual scenario with no conformity effects (stan-
dard deviation of 0.142). In other words, the conformity channel exacer-
bates the geographic polarization by 20 percent. This effect of confor-
mity is on the same order of magnitude as found with observational data:
on the basis of an event study of geographically mobile contributors, Perez-
Truglia (forthcoming) finds that conformity effects increase geographic
polarization by 27 percent.
These baseline results depend on the assumption that Du=u 5 1. In fact,
the counterfactual change in polarization is close to inversely proportional
to the value of Du=u. For instance, if we assume a value ofDu=u half as large,
the implied effect on polarization is about twice as large (40 percent),
and under the assumption that Du=u is twice as large, the implied effect
on polarization is about half as large (10 percent).B. Implications of the Comparison ChannelIn this section we provide a similar counterfactual analysis for the com-
parison channel. Bearing in mind that our experimental results indicate
significant comparison effects on the intensive margin but not on the ex-
tensive margin, we focus on Democrats’ contribution amounts rather than
on the share of Democrat contributors analyzed in the previous section.
Let Cki,z be the contribution from individual i in ZIP-3 area z ∈
f1, 2, ::: , Zg to a presidential candidate of party k ∈ {DEM, REP}, and let
~Cki,z be i ’s corresponding contribution in the counterfactual scenario with
no comparison effects. Let N kz be the number of contributors from ZIP-3
area z to the presidential candidate of party k: on the basis of our exper-
imental results, we assume that the number of contributors remains un-
changed with or without comparison effects. We can parameterize the com-
parison effects by means of the following equation:
Cki,z 5 ~C
k
i,z 1 d1
oi ~Cki,z
N kz
1 d2
N kz
okN kz
8 i, z, k, (5)
where we assume the parameter d1 to be positive, since our results indi-
cated that individuals contribute higher amounts when other contributorsThis content downloaded from 128.032.010.164 on July 01, 2017 14:26:51 PM
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partisan interactions 000from the same party and ZIP-3 contribute higher amounts. The parameter
d2, in turn, is assumed to be negative, since our experimental results indi-
cated that individuals contribute lower amounts if there is a higher share of
own-party contributors in the same ZIP-3.28 Let Ckz and ~C
k
z denote average
contributions in the actual and counterfactual scenarios.29 We can aver-
age equation (5) over i and solve for ~Ckz :
~Ckz 5
1
1 1 d1
Ckz 2
d2
1 1 d1
N kz
okN kz
8 z, k: (6)
Let C, N, and ~C denote the vectors with the average contributions and
number of contributors in all ZIP-3s. We can obtain the counterfactual
distribution of contributions ~C by replacing estimates of {C, N, d1, d2} into
equation (6). Analogously to the previous section, C and N are estimated
by means of the average contribution amounts and the number of con-
tributors in each ZIP-3 during the 2012 presidential election. We can also
obtain d1 and d2 from our experimental results. On the basis of the results
presented in column 2 of table 3, we use
d1 5
3:20
100
 1
0:215
5 0:149
and
d2 5
25:44  9
0:215
5 22:811:
Figure 6B depicts the distribution of the actual share of Democratic
contributions and the counterfactual distribution with no conformity ef-
fects. The results suggest that the comparison effects induce a slightly
smaller share of Democratic contributions: the actualmean share of Dem-
ocratic contributions is slightly lower (49.2 percent) than in the counter-
factual scenario with no comparison effects (51.8 percent). This effect is
due to a stronger free-riding effect for Democrats, given the higher aver-
age share of Democratic contributors in the United States. This exer-
cise also indicates that the standard deviation of the share of Democrat
contributions increases by just 1.1 percent in the counterfactual scenario28 In principle, our results cannot determine whether individuals care about the contri-
bution patterns in some reference group, such as their neighbors, or whether they simply
care about broader (e.g., nationwide) patterns.
28 As in the previous section, we should base our analysis on ~Ck2i,z , the average contribu-
tion excluding i’s own, but we make a simplifying assumption and use ~Cki,z instead. The dif-
ference this assumption makes is negligible given the large number of contributors in each
area.
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Allwith no comparison effects relative to the actual figure (from 0.275 to
0.278).30 This finding suggests that, unlike the conformity channel, the
comparison channel has a very small effect on geographic polarization.VI. ConclusionsWe presented novel evidence about the importance of partisan interac-
tions for political participation. We found that feeling observed by neigh-
bors significantly increases the contributions of individuals supporting the
local majority party but decreases contributions by supporters of the mi-
nority party. We found as well that an individual’s contribution is affected
by her perception of the contribution behavior of others, possibly because
of factors such as social norms and free riding. While our study examines
the particular case of campaign contributions, we believe that, except in
forms of participation that do not reveal partisanship (e.g., voting), similar
partisan interactions take place with other forms of political participation,
such as talking about politics, sharing political news, attending rallies, and
maybe even registering to vote.
We conclude by discussing some implications of our findings for the
disclosure of contribution records. With the advent of the internet and
the proliferation of online services provided by both the public and pri-
vate sectors, the issues of information disclosure and privacy have be-
come salient topics in the public debate.31 Nonetheless, there is still lim-
ited evidence about those issues and their effects. The requirement that
all campaign contributions be filed with a regulatory agency such as the
FEC is key to preventing corruption and to enforcing other campaign
regulations. The purpose of making detailed contribution records easily
accessible online to the general public is less clear, however. Themain jus-
tification of an open disclosure policy is that voters can use public records
to learn about candidates (Gilbert 2013).32 Our evidence suggests that30 The effect from the first term from the right-hand side of (6), which depends on d1,
has the same impact on contributions from both parties, and thus it cannot affect the par-
tisan geographic polarization of contributions. The second term, which depends on d2, can
have a differential impact on individuals identified with the minority and the majority par-
ties and can thus affect polarization.
31 Just in the last fewmonths of 2015, there were several cases that were widely covered in
the media, such as the dissemination of voters’ records (“Database of 191 Million U.S. Vot-
ers Exposed on Internet: Researcher,” Reuters, December 29, 2015), the right to remove
false information from online records compiled by private companies (“Justices Should
Let an Online Privacy Case Proceed,” New York Times, October 31, 2015), and the adoption
of stringent data protection rules following the Edward Snowden scandal (“Europe Ap-
proves Tough New Data Protection Rules,” New York Times, December 15, 2015).
32 In the words of the Supreme Court, “Disclosure provides the electorate with informa-
tion . . . in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office. It allows voters
to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely
on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches” (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976).
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partisan interactions 000public disclosure could have the unintended effect of facilitating social
pressure. Interestingly, these unintended effects were mentioned by the
Supreme Court decades before the contribution records became easily ac-
cessible online.33 This view of stigmatization is also consistent with some
anecdotal evidence, such as the use of FEC records to harass supporters
of ballot Proposition 8 in California in 2008 and the alleged use of these
records by the Internal Revenue Service to target supporters of the Tea
Party (e.g., Briffault 2010; La Raja 2014).
Some simple modifications to the current policy could reduce the un-
intended uses of the FEC records without compromising some of the other
goals of the regulation. If the goal of the FEC’s disclosure policy is to allow
voters to learn about candidates and to let journalists monitor corruption,
specific identifying information about who makes each contribution (e.g.,
name, address, employer) should be largely irrelevant, possibly with the
exception of large contributors. Thus, for smaller contributors the FEC
could restrict the amount of identifying information reported online (e.g.,
using initials instead of full names). Alternatively, the FEC could impose
a small pecuniary or nonpecuniary cost for accessing identifying infor-
mation about contributors, which could discourage individuals from using
the search tool to snoop on friends, relatives, and neighbors.34References
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